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Using direct and indirect subsidies to lower individual costs for small employers and self-employed We briefly describe what we learned about the problems associated with the high rate of uninsured persons among small businesses. We then review the strategies the demonstration projects have pursued and examine their results. Finally, we explore what policymakers can learn as they consider ways to expand coverage for the uninsured. businesses in their areas to understand more thoroughly the nature of the small-business insurance market, the characteristics of these small employers and their employees, and their reasons for not offering insurance. 4 The cost of insurance emerged as the major obstacle for small firms (Exhibit 2). Many small businesses have thin profit margins and thus fewer resources to pay for premiums. Cash flow is tight, and the uncertainty of both future income and expenses leads many new or marginal business owners to avoid the fixed cost of monthly insurance premiums. Seasonal businesses experience wide fluctuations in revenues, expenses, and employment levels. Also, many low-wage employees hired by these firms would not be able to contribute very much to the cost of insurance premiums even if coverage were available.
A major part of the cost problem is that small employers are usually charged more than large employers for comparable benefits. When setting premiums, insurers estimate administrative expenses at about 40 percent of claims for the smallest plans (one to four employees) and about 5.5 percent of claims for the largest (10,000 or more employees). 5 The need to establish and service accounts and to market plans to different firms accounts for much of the difference. For example, insurers' expenses for general administration are about 12.5 percent of claims for the smallest plans, compared with 0.7 percent for the largest, and 8.4 percent for selling and commission costs, compared with 0.1 percent.
Another critical factor that prompts insurers to raise premiums and limit the availability of their products is the perception that small groups pose higher risks than large groups. In part, the risk stems from the statistical phenomenon that risk can be spread more widely in a pool with a large number of enrollees than in one with fewer enrollees. Part of the markup, however, is also due to insurers' fears that small employers who have sicker employees are more likely to apply for insurance, a practice known as adverse risk selection, and that low-wage workers are more likely to consume more health care. In setting premiums, insurers build in a margin of 8.5 percent of claims for risk and profit for groups of one to four employees, compared with 1.1 percent for the largest groups. 6 Fragmentation of the private insurance market has contributed to the high cost of insurance for many small firms. For a variety of reasons, our country has moved away from the simple concept of using one insurance pool for everybody in a geographic area. Many larger firms saw the clear advantages of self-insuring to cover the claims of their employees who were often healthier than the general population. Today, self-funded plans cover about one-third of privately employed full-time workers who have employer-sponsored health coverage. 7 In the rest of the market, some relatively healthy groups get better-than-average rates, some cannot find an affordable plan, and others are excluded from coverage or are sharply restricted in what they can buy. The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), passed by Congress in 1974, exempts self-insured businesses from state insurance regulations that govern underwriting practices, minimum benefits requirements, premium taxes, and the like. In so doing, ERISA -exacerbates market fragmentation.
While not as significant as cost, problems with the insurance market were also cited by a number of small firms to explain why they do not offer insurance (Exhibit 2). First, insurers' methods of marketing insurance are not designed to meet the needs of small businesses. Many small employers say they cannot find an "acceptable plan" and often lack information or have difficulty judging plans. Small employers often lack staff to administer employee benefits and are generally less familiar with the options. Similarly, insurance brokers often find it difficult to schedule appointments with small employers to talk about health plans because the employers are consumed by business demands. The projects found these to be significant obstacles.
The final set of reasons for not offering health benefits relate to insurers' practices of excluding certain individuals or groups deemed high risk. Small employers said they were turned down because they were too small, their employees had preexisting medical conditions, or their type of business was considered high risk. Insurers commonly use a number of practices, including medical underwriting, that narrow the availability of insurance coverage for many small firms and individuals.
Given the way the insurance market is now structured, insurers still have a strong incentive to compete on the basis of selecting lower-risk cases.
Key Strategies To Improve Affordability Of Insurance
The projects' market research findings confirmed that barriers to both affordability and availability prevent small employers from obtaining health insurance. 'While these projects could not overcome all of the barriers, they attempted to make their insurance products both more affordable and available. There are two basic ways to lower the cost of insurance: either offer less coverage or provide subsidies. Projects unable to offer state subsidies had to rely on limiting the scope of services covered in their plans, increasing cost sharing, using very limited provider networks, or securing substantial discounts from hospitals. Projects that chose to use direct and indirect subsidies to reduce the cost of their plans generally provided more comprehensive benefits with only modest cost sharing. Each project used a mixture of the various strategies described below for making insurance more affordable (Exhibit 3).
Limited benefits. Projects that chose to cut premiums by limiting benefits used one of two approaches: (1) eliminating certain services from the benefit package, such as mental health care, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, dental and vision care, podiatry and chiropractic services, durable medical equipment, and transplants; or (2) The most limited benefits package developed under the Health Care for the Uninsured Program is Alabama's BasicCare. In the absence of state subsidy funds, the project designed a plan that covers ten inpatient days and six physician office visits per year (plus diagnostic x-ray and laboratory services, prescription drugs, outpatient surgery, ambulance and emergency room services, and limited home health and skilled nursing facility services). BasicCare is the only group insurance plan designed under the program that required waivers from a state's mandated-benefits laws to be licensed. Although BasicCare has been offered for nearly two years in Birmingham, demand has been lower than anticipated, with fewer than fifty previously uninsured firms enrolling.
Through surveys and focus groups, the projects found that small employers generally want benefit packages similar to those of large employers. They believe that hospitalization coverage is an essential feature and are not interested in plans that substantially limit this benefit. The projects responded by fashioning plans that cover hospital services but also saw the importance of promoting preventive and primary care by limiting cost sharing for those services.
Major cost sharing. Another benefit design strategy for reducing premiums is to require patients to pay for a portion of the health care services they receive, in the form of either deductibles and coinsurance charges or copayments. Two projects-Colorado's SCOPE and the Utah Community Health Plan-require major cost sharing for hospital inpatient care and other costly services while encouraging enrollees to seek preventive and primary care by limiting cost sharing for those services.
The Colorado project is the only demonstration that designed a new indemnity insurance mechanism for small groups, offering very affordable preventive and primary care services and good catastrophic coverage. The plan covers certain preventive services free of charge, including routine physicals, well-baby visits, and immunizations. Most other doctors' office visits require a $15 copayment (if a procedure is performed, the enrollee pays 50 percent). Enrollees must pay a $250 deductible and 50 percent of the next $5,000 in charges for hospital inpatient services, outpatient surgery, and certain other services. The annual out-of-pocket maximum for these services is $2,750 per enrollee. SCOPE costs about 40 percent less than traditional indemnity plans and now has nearly 8,000 enrollees in the Denver market.
The Utah Community Health Plan also uses both copayments and coinsurance mechanisms to lower premiums. For example, the project's high-option plan requires enrollees to pay $150 per day for the first four days of a hospital stay, and the low-option plan requires $200 per day for all days in the hospital. After detecting that a number of enrollees were misusing the emergency department by going there for nonemergency care, the project changed its cost-sharing provision for emergency services from a flat $50 copayment to 50 percent coinsurance; coverage under the low-option plan is also subject to a $300 deductible. The plan has enrolled about 1,700 members in the Salt Lake City area.
Limited provider network. All of the projects that developed new insurance plans use health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or preferred provider organizations (PPOs) to manage care. The Utah, Alabama, and Tennessee demonstrations further restrict enrollees' freedom of choice by channeling them to a limited group of less costly providers, including community-based clinics and/ or public hospitals.
When given a choice between a very limited network of public providers and a broader network that includes private providers, most of the employers purchasing BasicCare in Birmingham, Alabama, have selected the private option. BasicCare's "public option" network comprises five county-run clinics for primary care services and the countyrun hospital for most acute care services. Over 80 percent of the enrolled groups have opted to pay about 40 percent more in premiums to gain access to BasicCare's "private option" network, which has four additional private hospitals, plus university-based primary care physicians.
Premium subsidies. Direct premium subsidies encourage the purchase of health insurance by directly paying a portion of the designated premiums for individual small employers and/ or their employees. Direct subsidies are provided only to those least able to pay for coverage. In four state-sponsored projects-Maine, Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin-the state government provides direct premium subsidies for lowincome enrollees using a sliding fee scale. The Florida project uses state funds to "buy down" the cost of coverage for employees' dependents.
Indirect subsidies facilitate the purchase of insurance by reducing the premiums charged to the entire small-group market. Indirect subsidies reduce insurers' costs by performing or subsidizing administrative, marketing, and pooling functions or by reducing the threat of adverse risk selection by paying for or facilitating the purchase of reinsurance or by providing stop-loss protection (in effect, a ceiling on catastrophic expenses). The Florida Health Access Corporation indirectly subsidizes the costs of pooling small employees into a single, organized buying cooperative. Arizona, Florida, and Maine have been able to lower premiums through a combination of these indirect subsidy mechanisms.
A key to the Florida project's success is its ability to carry out administrative functions commonly provided either by the employee benefits department in a large company or by the indemnity or managed care plan. Staff members assist new enrollees in preparing their applications, perform limited underwriting, and calculate premiums. The project maintains membership records, collects monthly premiums from participating businesses, and pays the contracted plan in a monthly lump sum. Plans are thus able to treat the Florida Health Access Corporation as if it were a single large company, rather than a multitude of small businesses. The Florida project has its market clout to negotiate broader benefits, restrict underwriting, and-lower premiums.
The marginal cost of enrolling a new member in a buying cooperative's plan is relatively small. Once the potentially high start-up costs of establishing the buying cooperative organization are met, the per capita costs for these operations decrease as enrollment increases. In contrast, a project that relies on direct premium subsidies pays the same amount to lower the cost for each new enrollee as for the first enrollee.
Projects using indirect subsidies have received more consistent and ongoing support from their state legislatures than those that rely exclusively on direct premium subsidy strategies; The Florida, Maine, and Arizona projects have each used cash and in-kind contributions to develop unique new health insurance products, negotiate underwriting contracts with HMOs, develop administrative systems, and market their plans extensively. In contrast, the Michigan and Wisconsin projects essentially provided direct subsidies to small firms to defray the cost of buying existing products for their low-wage workers; when these states experienced serious fiscal problems, they canceled their projects. This suggests that programs relying on direct premium subsidies alone may be more vulnerable than programs using indirect subsidies.
According to Ree Sailors, executive director of the Florida Health Access Corporation, the Florida project provides a better "match" for state funds than the Medicaid program. Sixty-six percent of the project's premium dollars come from employers, and only 37 percent come from the state. The project takes dollars that would have been spent sporadically on episodic health care and prudently marshals them, with the assistance of state dollars, into a program providing year-round coverage that includes preventive care, primary care, prenatal care, and hospitalization-all of the comprehensive benefits of an HMO package.
Provider discounts. Most projects have negotiated discounts from providers, especially hospitals. In return, the project channels patients to participating hospitals, and these hospitals receive payment for treating patients who might otherwise be uninsured and unable to pay. The Tennessee project negotiated an 80 percent discount on inpatient services from the Regional Medical Center in Memphis. In Salt Lake City, six hospitals give the Utah Community Health Plan a 35 percent discount off billed charges for the first thirty days of an enrollee's stay and waive all charges for additional days. While provider discounts can help to lower premiums significantly, projects have found it difficult to replicate such commitments when trying to expand into other communities.
Link to state high-risk pool. At least twenty-seven states have enacted laws to create high-risk insurance pools to cover individuals considered by insurers to be high risk or "uninsurable." In the Maine and Wisconsin projects, the state government contributes to the premium payment for low-income, high-risk employees. This mechanism allows high-risk individuals to obtain additional financial assistance and permits the rest of the group to be offered coverage at a better price.
Strategies For Making Health Insurance More Available
These demonstrations were limited in their ability to address insurers' underwriting and exclusionary practices, which will require systemwide reform of the small-group health insurance market. While highlighting the need for insurance market reforms, the projects have made important strides in testing new mechanisms for creating larger and more stable insurance pools and marketing to uninsured small firms.
Limited medical underwriting and industry exclusions. The projects sought to limit the exclusionary practices used by many insurers to reduce the perceived risks of the small-group market. For example, the Arizona project created a new insurance product with no medical underwriting, and the Florida project permits women to obtain coverage through their sixth month of pregnancy. The projects did not exclude as many types of small businesses as is now common in the small-group market, and some included businesses in their first year of operation.
Larger, more stable insurance pools. Creating larger and more stable insurance pools makes insurance more available to uninsured small employers by spreading the risk more broadly and thereby lowering the cost of premiums. This strategy requires indirect subsidies to offset project design costs, administrative costs, and reinsurance premiums until the number of enrollees is large enough to make the cost per enrollee negligible, or at least closer to the administrative and reinsurance costs of large-group plans. Florida has created a buying cooperative for formerly uninsured small businesses; several projects have implemented risk-sharing and reinsurance mechanisms for developing these pools.
Innovative, aggressive marketing and advertising. In general, the projects found that uninsured small employers are a very "tough sell." Insurers' traditional marketing methods are less effective in the small- business market. Uninsured small employers are hard to reach, and without full-time benefits managers on their staff, they require more education and information, follow-up, and support, especially during the application process. The most successful projects have used professional advertising firms to develop marketing materials and campaigns and have used public relations efforts to generate additional media coverage. Those that have not invested substantially in marketing and public relations have generally had disappointing enrollment growth.
A major reason for SCOPE's marketing success in Colorado has been its ability to engage the media, not merely as purveyors of advertising, but as partners in reaching the target market. The project asked Denver's newspaper, radio, and television executives to donate substantial advertising time and space. While the project spent approximately $177,000 on its initial and follow-up advertising campaigns, it received $80,000 to $90,000 in contributed media time and space. Many of the projects have also used public relations efforts effectively to generate television stories and newspaper articles about their initiatives. Such reports can often explain the unique features of their products more thoroughly and identify the target population more clearly than brief media advertisements. Generating this coverage, however, requires substantial staff time to cultivate reporters and producers. Through these cooperative arrangements, these projects have been able to use their limited resources as leverage for more extensive marketing efforts. 8 
Results Of The Projects
The results of these projects vary greatly, in terms of both enrollment and market penetration. However, these results are also subject to different interpretations, depending upon whether the reader is measuring success in terms of covering the uninsured or in convincing policymakers and the insurance industry that, with some changes in how insurers do business, there is a profitable untapped market for their products.
Premiums. All of the projects offer premiums significantly below national averages for HMO benefit plans (Exhibit 4). For the plans targeted at uninsured small businesses, the premiums ranged from 9 to 60 percent below market rates, with most ranging from 25 to 50 percent below market rates. Premium data on the Washington Basic Health Plan show that subsidizing a comprehensive health plan for individuals below 200 percent of the poverty level can be very expensive. Since the Basic Health Plan is not offered through employers, there are no employer contributions to the premium. The program uses a substantial state subsidy to reach the lowest-income persons. For those with incomes below 75 percent of poverty, the rates are about 94 percent below the prices that HMOs might charge for a similar benefit package, if such a plan were offered to individuals in the open market. Enrollment. In total, the projects have enrolled over 48,000 persons, which includes about 26,000 employees and dependents through 5,500 small businesses and 22,000 individuals through the Washington Basic Health Plan (Exhibit 5). The projects appear to be the most attractive to very small employer groups: the average firm size is 2.8 employees and the average group, 4.9 persons (including employees and dependents).
The Florida and Colorado projects together have two-thirds of the program's total small-group enrollment. Both projects have plans available in multiple markets and have devoted significant resources to sophisticated marketing and public relations efforts. The Florida project is available in four sites covering sixteen of Florida's sixty-seven counties, and SCOPE is now available in all of Colorado's major population centers. Next highest is Arizona's Health Care Group, which is available in three sites and has devoted considerable resources to marketing.
Washington's Basic Health Plan, which enrolls only individuals, has capped enrollment at approximately 22,000, because of limited state subsidy funds. The project demonstrates the great appeal of offering a very highly subsidized insurance product directly to individuals. In just over two years of operation and with a minimal marketing budget, the project has enrolled far more people than any of the employer-group demonstrations. When such a publicly subsidized product is offered to individuals, however, some employers may perceive that it is not their responsibility to offer group coverage to their low-wage employees. Market penetration. We asked the project directors to estimate the level of "market penetration" the projects have achieved. We define market penetration as the ratio of the number of firms or persons enrolled in the project's plan(s) to the number of firms or persons in their target market. The projects define their target populations differently (Exhibit 6). They also did not use uniform data in making their estimates. While they all know precisely the number of firms or persons enrolled (the numerator), deriving an accurate estimate of the number of uninsured small firms and the numbers of uninsured persons associated with these firms (the denominator) is problematic. In calculating pattern of reaching only a small proportion of the working uninsured. These low penetration figures may be due to several factors. Some projects are still relatively new and will need more time, perhaps several years, to reach their full potential. In general, the projects have reported higher penetration percentages in their smaller and more rural sites than in larger urban centers. The highest penetration rate of any project-17.3 percent-is reported in the Bath/ Brunswick community of Maine. 9 Similarly, the Arizona project estimates that it has reached nearly 11 percent of the uninsured small-business market in rural Cochise County but only 5 percent in urban Tucson, where the project began operating two years earlier.
The projects have targeted the chronically uninsured. All but one project (Colorado's SCOPE) require enrollees to have "gone bare" for a minimum period of time preceding enrollment, ranging from six to twenty-four months.. The projects have tried neither to compete with existing insurers for the markets these insurers now serve nor to attract employers who are shopping for a better deal at the time of renewal. Instead, they have sought the "residual" market made up of a heterogeneous group of very small firms that many indemnity insurers and HMOs have ignored or purposefully excluded from their main lines of business.
Unfortunately, the rapid inflation in health insurance premiums during this demonstration period consumed virtually all of the subsidy offered. During 1987-1989, while the projects were developing their plans, the average price of a group health insurance policy nationwide shot up 48 percent for individuals and 51.7 percent for families. 10 Therefore, even though the projects were able to offer these premiums significantly below market rates, most of this subsidy effort merely shielded them from the consequences of such rapid premium increases.
Utilization. Early utilization experience of these projects indicates that insurers' fear of adverse selection for the small-group market may not be justified. These plans' initial use of health services is lower than anticipated and lower than national averages for three common measures of use of inpatient services: discharges per thousand members, inpatient days per thousand members, and average length-of-stay (Exhibit 7). For three projects-Arizona, Florida, and Utah-these statistics are below the averages for HMOs nationwide and even further below the overall national average for persons under age sixty-five. Maine reported lower figures for both discharges and inpatient days but an average length-of-stay between the HMO and national averages.
These early utilization experiences are positive signs for those seeking to broaden coverage to the currently uninsured, because they indicate that if these small groups are channeled into managed care plans, their use of hospital services, at least, may be no higher than that of large groups. Enrollment in the demonstration projects, however, is still relatively low, and further research is needed to adjust these data for health status, demographic characteristics, and other factors, to compare them more accurately with the utilization experience of enrollees in other plans. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is currently supporting research to examine utilization data from several of these demonstration projects and other pools of small businesses. These research projects are examining whether employees of small firms and individual health plan subscribers use more health care services than employees of large firms and groups, whether previously uninsured persons use more health care services once they receive coverage than those already insured, and whether medical underwriting really lowers insurance costs.
Implications For The Small-Group Insurance Market
As distinct from national demonstrations organized to test a single model or intervention, these projects used different strategies to make insurance more affordable and available. Taken as a whole, the projects' experiences offer a better understanding of the problem of uninsured workers and enable us to draw important implications for public policy. These projects test whether small employers would buy a less expensive, more available product voluntarily. They also provide insight into whether the types of public/ private partnerships used in these demonstrations could expand access substantially, short of major federal and/ or state interventions to change the way health care is financed.
Universal participation. The major policy implication from these demonstrations is that efforts to expand the current employer-based insurance system are not likely to achieve universal financial access to health care without requiring universal participation. While public/ private partnerships focused on the small-group market offer the prospect of using limited public dollars as leverage to attract employer and employee contributions, the results of these demonstrations suggest that it will be extremely difficult to achieve significant market penetration. To date, the highest penetration rate reported by any project is 17 percent of formerly uninsured employers; most others have attracted 10 percent or less. Although the projects did not test whether more extensive subsidies could result in higher penetration rates in the small-group market, we question whether subsidies greater than 50 percent are the most efficient way to solve this problem. A variety of obstacles must be overcome if all employers are to offer health benefits. The decision to begin offering health benefits is a decision to increase labor costs, but many small firms are forced to minimize costs to stay in business. Competitive pressures are felt especially keenly by new firms and those in low-margin industries. Some employers can hire workers without offering insurance, a factor that varies widely by industry, region, local labor supply, and local economies.
Given our results, some may view employer mandate (play-or-pay) proposals as an attractive strategy for expanding health insurance coverage. While none of the demonstration projects tested an employer mandate explicitly, their experience tells us that it would be especially onerous to require all small employers to buy insurance in the current market. Even with the reform proposals being considered at the federal and state levels to make small-group insurance coverage more available, it would still be more costly to administer health insurance for small groups than for large groups. Under an employer-based system, we do not believe it is fair that employees in small firms are forced to pay more for health insurance than their counterparts in large firms. Thus, governmental support would be needed to consolidate the purchasing power of small businesses and to subsidize administrative costs, if the disparity between large and small groups is to be reduced.
Employer mandates would reduce insurers' fears that firms that purchase insurance are more likely to have employees with a current need on October 10, 2017 by HW Team for health care. Employer mandates also would reduce the kinds of intensive marketing efforts needed to locate small-business owners and persuade them to offer health insurance, but would not eliminate the need for more thorough educational and sales/ support services than insurers have traditionally provided. Also, mandates would not obviate the need to assist low-income workers, especially those below 200 percent of poverty. Finally, the projects' experience tells us that an employer mandate approach should not exclude firms with fewer than five employees; this would fail to address a significant part of the problem.
Improving the current system. These demonstrations indicate that before or until we achieve our apparent goal of providing universal financial access to health care, some significant steps can be taken to improve the current voluntary insurance system. If this country intends to continue using employers as the basic mechanism for distributing health insurance, policymakers must address three fundamental and interrelated problems, already discussed, regarding the small-group health insurance market: (1) the small-group health insurance market is highly fragmented; (2) administrative costs are higher in the small-group market than for larger groups; and (3) the majority of uninsured persons can no longer afford the average cost of health insurance at today's rates. Each step described below addresses one or more of these problems.
First, government regulations are needed to stabilize the small-group market by limiting abusive rating practices, guaranteeing the availability and renewability of coverage, and spreading excess cost of insuring high-risk groups more broadly. While such regulations reduce barriers to the availability of health insurance for small businesses, they do not address the primary problem of affordability and are likely to raise costs for some currently insured groups. Under these regulations, no small firm would be denied coverage, and premiums for all groups would be confined to a much narrower range than is now the case. If more averagerisk or higher-risk groups seek coverage, premiums for lower-risk groups could rise over their current levels. On the other hand, preliminary data from these projects suggest that an expanded pool of enrollees from small groups may not result in significantly higher premiums.
Second, if the current employer-based system is to continue, government can encourage the development of buying cooperatives, in which small firms in the same geographic area consolidate their market power and share administrative costs. Government could subsidize these administrative costs to equalize the net costs to both small and large firms for providing coverage to their employees. As the number of enrollees grows, the marginal cost of these indirect subsidies per new enrollee would drop. The Florida project can serve as a model for policymakers seeking to implement such a strategy. At the time of this writing, Florida Health Access had over 9,600 members (all previously uninsured); it is the fastest-growing of all of the demonstrations.
Third, governments can encourage aggressive marketing and education aimed at small firms. Employers report that some employees do not want health benefits. Low-wage workers, in particular, may prefer cash income to health benefits, and young "invincibles" feel they do not need insurance protection. Business owners may have an individual policy for themselves or know that key employees already have other coverage. Insurers have traditionally designed their marketing campaigns to target the large-group market, yet these techniques are generally not sufficient to meet the needs of small firms. A state could simplify small employers' task of shopping for an acceptable plan and reduce insurers' marketing costs by giving its "seal of approval" to a limited number of health plans in each market. Further public subsidies could support the marketing services needed to reach uninsured small firms and educate them about these select products. Policymakers can benefit from the innovative marketing practices tested by the Denver, Florida, and San Francisco demonstrations, in particular. Even with aggressive marketing, these projects found it very difficult to convince small-business owners to begin offering health care benefits.
Fourth, government subsidies can help low-income workers and their families to obtain health coverage in the current system. About 60 percent of uninsured persons under age sixty-five have incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty level, and the premiums of an average HMO plan would consume at least 16 percent of gross income for such a person's family. 11 Even after market reforms and indirect subsidies to small-group health insurance, insurance premiums would continue to be too expensive for many small employers and their low-wage employees.
The demonstration projects have tested specific mechanisms for targeting public dollars to lower health insurance premiums for the neediest workers. The Michigan and Wisconsin projects offer lessons on using income-based subsidies for employees with incomes below 200 percent of poverty. The Florida project shows how to subsidize the portion of the family premium used. to cover an employee's spouse and children, because employers generally contribute less for dependent coverage than for the individual employee's coverage. The Maine project also has a mechanism for identifying and assisting financially vulnerable firms as well as self-employed individuals.
One drawback to relying on government subsidies is the potential for small employers not to enroll because they do not want to offer a benefit that they would have to take away if the subsidy were eliminated. This on October 10, 2017 by HW Team fear was clearly justified in the Michigan and Wisconsin projects, where the legislatures cut off funding for direct premium subsidies amidst state fiscal crises. If governments want subsidies to work, they must provide assurance that the programs will be maintained.
Finally, in a voluntary system, it is also important to cover those employees not offered coverage by their employers, including part-time and seasonal workers. To cover these workers and their families, government should ensure that affordable individual coverage is available. It could approve and subsidize an existing product or create a new publicly supported insurance plan for those not covered through employers. The Washington Basic Health Plan is an example of how a state can successfully contract with managed care organizations in local markets to provide a uniform benefit package to families with incomes under 200 percent of poverty and use state funds to make that basic coverage affordable. Another option, which would require federal waivers, is to use Medicaid as the public fail-safe program open to all persons, with enrollees contributing premiums based on their ability to pay.
Concluding Thoughts
These demonstration projects have shown that it is possible to help some who want coverage to obtain it. If extending these strategies nationally could cover even 20 percent of the working uninsured, over 4.6 million people would gain financial access to care. While it is clear to us that voluntary efforts to expand coverage, particularly in the small-group market, will not achieve universal access, our society has thus far been unwilling or unable to move to a mandatory system. As various options are debated and tried, the lessons learned by these projects should prove useful. Furthermore, these projects provide objective information about a segment of the health insurance market-the small-group market-which until recently has received little attention.
While theory can suggest how a particular strategy for increasing access might work, we need the reality of demonstrations to illustrate how difficult implementation can be. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Health Care for the Uninsured Program shows how easily it is to underestimate the operational complexities of achieving reform. Further experimentation is needed. This will require encouragement and flexibility from the federal government, leadership and creativity from the states, and the technical expertise and support of the private sector. Such programs would provide further lessons for policymakers and valuable data for designing the details of future national proposals. Further experimentation will help this country resolve its long-standing struggle over how to best achieve our generally accepted goal of providing universal access to care for all Americans.
